Dr Anthony Ridge-Newman
Associate Dean and Associate Professor
Faculty of Creative Arts and Humanities
Liverpool Hope University. Anthony holds a University of London PhD in Politics and led two academic networks for the Political Studies Association over five years. His research specialism is political organisation, change and communication. Anthony has published four books and has been a practitioner in journalism, politics and commercial strategic communication.
Email: ridgena@hope.ac.uk
UK Election 2024
Section 4: Parties and the campaign
34. A changed but over-staged Labour Party and the political marketing weaknesses behind Starmer’s win (Prof Jennifer Lees-Marshment)
35. To leaflet or not to leaflet? The question of election leafleting in Sunderland Central (Prof Angela Smith, Dr Mike Pearce)
36. Beyond ‘my dad was a toolmaker’: what it’s really like to be working class in parliament (Dr Vladimir Bortun)
37. The unforced errors of foolish men: gender, race and the calculus of harm (Prof Karen Ross)
38. Election 2024 and rise of Reform UK: the beginning of the end of the Conservatives? (Dr Anthony Ridge-Newman)
39. The Weakening of the Blue Wall (Prof Pete Dorey)
40. The Conservative party, 1832-2024: an obituary (Dr Mark Garnett)
41. Bouncing back: the Liberal Democrat campaign (Prof Peter Sloman)
42. The Greens: riding two horses (Prof Neil Carter, Dr Mitya Pearson)
43. Party organisations and the campaign (Dr Danny Rye)
44. Local campaign messaging at the 2024 General Election (Dr Siim Trumm, Prof Caitlin Milazzo)
45. The value of getting personal: reflecting upon the role of personal branding in the General Election (Dr Jenny Lloyd)
46. Which constituencies were visited by each party leader and what this told us about their campaigns (Dr Hannah Bunting, Joely Santa Cruz)
47. The culture wars and the 2024 General Election campaign (Prof John Steel)
48. “Rishi’s D-Day Disaster”: authority, leadership and British military commemoration (Dr Natalie Jester)
49. Party election broadcasts: the quest for authenticity (Dr Vincent Campbell)
In 2024, the Conservative Party, the UK’s most historically successful political party, experienced its greatest loss of seats in a general election for about 200 years. Quite a contrast to the party’s large parliamentary majority in 2019. The 2024 Election saw a total Tory wipeout in Wales and massive losses in England, amid sharp increases in vote share for Reform UK. Under the leadership of Nigel Farage, Reform UK is a populist-right movement that evolved from the single-issue Brexit Party.
On Times Radio, former Conservative MP Nigel Evans described Reform UK as the “silent snipers”. So, what does the rise of Reform mean for the future and survival of the Conservatives? What are the main factors contributing to Conservative decline?
This succinct analysis focuses on change within the party, since 2010, across three key factors: the efficacy of party organisation; leadership; and campaigns. It argues that, despite the 2019 election result, Tory decline is embedded in over a decade of questionable choices, approaches and actions that culminate in a potentially existential electoral decline. The decline is evident in the 2024 result and rise of Reform UK through a significant swing vote to Reform from the Conservatives, leading to Reform UK winning five parliamentary seats and finishing ahead of the Tories in many other constituencies.
When compared to the general elections of 2010, 2015, 2017 and 2024, the 2019 General Election was an outlier election in that the country seemingly voted for the central Conservative campaign issue to “Get Brexit Done”. With that aim in mind, the then Brexit (now Reform) Party did not stand candidates against the Conservatives. After Brexit was “done” in 2020, the Conservatives, under Boris Johnson, became plagued by ethical scandals during and beyond the Covid period. Johnson’s demise as leader was followed by Liz Truss’s short leadership of the party, which became famous for crashing the UK economy. Within weeks, the Conservatives’ reputation for fiscal responsibility and being the natural party of government was largely consigned to history. According to Farage, consistent post-Brexit Tory failure triggered the evolution of Reform UK.
After years of internal Brexit machinations; claims of Covid corruption; a cost of living crisis; and the party’s approach to small boat channel crossings, Rishi Sunak inherited a damaged, divided and toxic party brand, plagued by significant failures in leadership since David Cameron’s 2016 EU referendum gamble. In 2010, party organisation, under Cameron, was enhanced by an influx of new members, many of whom were under the age of 30. These young Conservatives injected energy into the party organisation and campaigns and brought a new fluid digital component to the grassroots campaign. In 2015, the party made its first steps in disenfranchising many younger supporters through centralising and controlling its digital campaigns. From 2012, there was a shift towards a similar centralised approach to eroding the autonomy of local Conservative associations, whose members were framed as “swivel eyed loons”. This contempt for ordinary party members, younger people (university students in particular) and a ruthless top-down reorganisation of many Conservative associations continued to be a damaging if latent characteristic of party organisation in the run-up to 2024.
By the 2017 election, the party under Theresa May, had significantly disenfranchised its younger contingent and was dwarfed by Labour’s online campaign activity. Despite May’s lacklustre campaign and noticeable decline in Tory support, the Conservatives limped on with a reduced majority. May’s inability to secure a Brexit deal with the EU, and maintain party discipline, triggered one of the most disunited periods in party postwar history; and, importantly, Farage’s launch of the Brexit (now Reform) Party. The five Conservative premiers from 2010 to 2024 made a series of questionable choices and actions, from initiating a divisive EU referendum to proroguing Parliament and holding Downing Street parties during Covid lockdowns; and from crashing the economy to leaving D-Day celebrations early during an election. Combined it shows 14 years of Conservative instability and questionable leadership.
The damage to parliamentary politics because of Brexit was eclipsed by the enormity of Covid. Yet, the damage to the Conservatives in the form of increasing factionalisation was simmering under the surface of a persistently divided party, which, following the EU referendum, plagued all Conservative premiers, including Sunak. While Sunak’s 2024 campaign is a textbook example of how not to fight an election, an improved Tory campaign is unlikely to have made much difference. The result, especially considering the decline in Labour vote share, and low national turnout, signals less a Labour win and rather more to voter repulsion at the Conservatives.
The real electoral success story is the expansion of the smaller parties. Reform’s spread of vote poses a tangible threat to the existence of the Conservative Party in 2029. The last 14 years of Conservative government has been characterised by a consistent thread of arrogance, imperiousness, contempt and incompetence, which has now been humbled by the threat of electoral wipeout into the future. The Tories would do well to reflect on the above; shift back to the centre ground; adopt a more sober approach to party discipline; and engage its historic pragmatism to unify around the leader and overhaul the party away from disunity and factionalism.
