Dr Tom Sharkey
Lecturer in Criminal Justice at Canterbury Christ Church University. He has recently completed a PhD in Political Philosophy.
Email: tom.sharkey@canterbury.ac.uk
Dr Sophie Quirk
Senior Lecturer in Drama and Theatre at the University of Kent.
Email: S.Quirk@kent.ac.uk
UK Election 2024
Section 8: Personality politics and popular culture
87. Ed Davey: Towards a Liberal Populism? (Dr Tom Sharkey, Dr Sophie Quirk)
88. Why Nigel Farage’s anti-media election interference claims are so dangerous (Dr Lone Sorensen)
89. Nigel Farage and the political circus (Dr Neil Ewen)
90. Binface, Beany and Beyond: humorous candidates in the 2024 General Election (Prof Scott Wright)
91. What Corbyn support reveals about how Starmer’s Labour won big (Prof Cornel Sandvoss, Dr Benjamin Litherland, Dr Joseph Andrew Smith)
92. “Well that was dignified, wasn’t it?”: floor apportionment and interaction in the televised debates (Dr Sylvia Shaw)
93. TV debates: beyond winners and losers (Prof Stephen Coleman)
94. Is our television debate coverage finally starting to match up to multi-party politics? (Dr Louise Thompson)
95. Tetchiness meets disenchantment: capturing the contrasting political energies of the campaign (Prof Beth Johnson, Prof Katy Parry)
96. “We’re just normal men”: football and the performance of authentic leadership (Dr Ellen Watts)
97. ‘Make the friendship bracelets’: gendered imagery in candidates’ self-presentations on the campaign trail (Dr Caroline Leicht)
98. Weeping in Wetherspoons: generative Al and the right/left image battle on X (Simon Popple)
99. An entertaining election? Popular culture as politics (Prof John Street)
100. Changing key, but keeping time: the music of Election 2024 (Dr Adam Behr)
101. Truth or dare: the political veracity game (Prof John Corner)
The notion of a liberal populism seems paradoxical. Liberalism has been the dominant ideological position in Western electoral politics since the mid-twentieth century. This has made the construction of a liberal outsider, or alternative, seem impossible. The politicians, movements and parties that we label as ‘populist’ have positioned themselves as anti-liberal in order to be anti-elite. If we understand populism as a form of anti-establishment politics, then liberalism and populism must be viewed as mutually exclusive. However, if we understand populism not as ideology but as political style, then that style may be adopted by a wider range of political standpoints and parties, especially when illiberal actions by the incumbent government have caused widespread anger and disgust. During the 2024 General Election campaign, the Liberal Democrats have begun to make sense of the liberal-populist paradox. Performances by party leader Ed Davey have been a key factor within this.
At its core, liberalism holds a commitment to universalism, the rule of law, governance through large institutions and, consequently, to government by experienced individuals who are accomplished in the performance of political etiquette and competence. Populists have opposed all of these ideals. They reject the liberal aim of a heterogenous but unified society and instead appeal to a specific base, from the ethno-nationalism of Reform UK and Marine Le Pen’s National Rally in France, to the anti-economic establishment policies of Podemos in Spain and the Five Star Movement in Italy. In the UK, the Conservative Government subverted the ideals of liberalism in ways that may have been intended to appeal to populist demographics, but seriously backfired: the electorate was to punish the Government’s rejection of the rule of law (see, for example, attacks on the judiciary in the wake of the Miller cases, the Partygate scandal, or the undermining of treaty commitments in the Safety of Rwanda Act) and its lack of technocratic competence (see, for example, how Liz Truss’ poor oratory and the image of Rishi Sunak announcing the election, umbrella-less in the rain, have stuck in the public imagination). This opened the possibility for the Liberal Democrats to perform liberalism as the outsider position.
In The Global Rise of Populism, Benjamin Moffitt focuses on the staging of populism. Here, populism is a performance style characterised by the eschewing of technocratic language and the harnessing of crisis to communicate with a specific demos, or social group. This moves away from more established ideas about what populism is – including, for example, Paul Taggart or Cas Mudde’s positing of populism as a specific ideology, or the discursive approach to populism as political logic by theorist Ernesto Laclau – instead suggesting that populism exists in how populist politicians perform politics.
Davey held the media’s attention through a series of stunts in which his position as a longstanding, mainstream politician was incongruously juxtaposed with images of him riding the teacups, falling off a paddleboard, and hurtling down a waterslide. Media coverage has repeatedly highlighted the “undignified” nature of these activities, and Liberal Democrat strategists have acknowledged that “Ed looking silly” has been the price of vital publicity for a small party that would otherwise struggle to hold media attention or register in voters’ awareness. Davey has emphasised that the stunts are each linked to a meaningful policy pledge and, he argues, have been successful in raising awareness of his party’s offer.
Arguably, this tactic belongs to populist politics. Moffitt identifies that populist leaders actively demonstrate their difference to the technocratic political classes by behaving in ways that competent politicians should not; this appeals to audiences who are disengaged with, or distrustful of, the mainstream political class. Importantly, Davey’s stunts are also designed and performed in ways that emphasise his authenticity: his visible enjoyment in baking with children and drumming on exercise balls with the elderly, the visceral reality of a body falling into chilly water, all contribute to the persuasiveness of the performance. Much of the wider campaign likewise hinged on Davey’s authenticity, with the Liberal Democrat’s first election broadcast aiming for an intimate portrayal of his home life and role as a carer.
Atypical behaviour is typical of populist leaders. Nigel Farage, for example, appeals to his target audience with a persona that opposes the polite technocracy of Westminster’s mainstream with brash, anti-politically-correct boisterousness. This is effective both in engaging his core audience and alienating many others. The difference with Davey’s brand of liberal populism is that Davey employs comic licence and play. Both give him access to a suspension of the rules around competent and polite behaviour which, crucially, both Davey and his audience understand to be temporary. The use of joking and play enable Davey to demonstrate his rule-breaking before snapping back in to more traditional performances of political competence.
The Liberal Democrats may not fully realise a liberal populism, but we argue that they have shown us what it could look like. Following their historic success on election night, a liberal populism seems significantly more plausible than it ever has before.
